Air Aces

El tactiano de pro gusta de la Historia. El tactiano de pro cuenta, aprende y se lo pasa igual de bien no olvidando las cosas que han conformado el planeta en que habita.

Air Aces

Notapor syncho » 14 Oct 2007, 23:47

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Notapor zentao 2.0 » 15 Oct 2007, 01:52

me encanta el tema pero preferiria que pusieras un post mas masticao , por ciert que hay unos documentales de combates aereos contados por el ganador y con una reproduccion en 3d del combate,no pongo el link por que ahora no va, lo malo del documental es que solo salen ases americanos que ademas no se pueden comparar en derribos a otros ases.

tambien hay otro documental que se llama las alas alas de la fama que cuenta la historia de la aviacion española,parte de esta va muy unida a ramon franco y sus records de vuelo,aparte lo presenta angel nieto que sale pilotando un avion.
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Notapor syncho » 15 Oct 2007, 07:49

zentao 2.0 escribió:me encanta el tema pero preferiria que pusieras un post mas masticao , por ciert que hay unos documentales de combates aereos contados por el ganador y con una reproduccion en 3d del combate,no pongo el link por que ahora no va, lo malo del documental es que solo salen ases americanos que ademas no se pueden comparar en derribos a otros ases.

tambien hay otro documental que se llama las alas alas de la fama que cuenta la historia de la aviacion española,parte de esta va muy unida a ramon franco y sus records de vuelo,aparte lo presenta angel nieto que sale pilotando un avion.


Zentao, si no he puesto más información en el post era porque no eran horas para empezar a explicar nada, más cuando es un enlace que cada uno puede indagar por sí solo...

Lo que dices del documental, el primero te referirás a los grandes combates aéreos y es como dices, recrean por ordenador algunos combates buenísimos que sucedieron. Me encantó el de la guerra de Corea. Pero también lo vi falta de información...
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Notapor zentao 2.0 » 15 Oct 2007, 17:23

syncho escribió:
zentao 2.0 escribió:me encanta el tema pero preferiria que pusieras un post mas masticao , por ciert que hay unos documentales de combates aereos contados por el ganador y con una reproduccion en 3d del combate,no pongo el link por que ahora no va, lo malo del documental es que solo salen ases americanos que ademas no se pueden comparar en derribos a otros ases.

tambien hay otro documental que se llama las alas alas de la fama que cuenta la historia de la aviacion española,parte de esta va muy unida a ramon franco y sus records de vuelo,aparte lo presenta angel nieto que sale pilotando un avion.


Zentao, si no he puesto más información en el post era porque no eran horas para empezar a explicar nada, más cuando es un enlace que cada uno puede indagar por sí solo...

Lo que dices del documental, el primero te referirás a los grandes combates aéreos y es como dices, recrean por ordenador algunos combates buenísimos que sucedieron. Me encantó el de la guerra de Corea. Pero también lo vi falta de información...


menus excusas y cirrate un hilo con fotos videos enlaces y demas ,te lo digo de coña eh?
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Notapor zentao 2.0 » 15 Oct 2007, 17:24

syncho escribió:
zentao 2.0 escribió:me encanta el tema pero preferiria que pusieras un post mas masticao , por ciert que hay unos documentales de combates aereos contados por el ganador y con una reproduccion en 3d del combate,no pongo el link por que ahora no va, lo malo del documental es que solo salen ases americanos que ademas no se pueden comparar en derribos a otros ases.

tambien hay otro documental que se llama las alas alas de la fama que cuenta la historia de la aviacion española,parte de esta va muy unida a ramon franco y sus records de vuelo,aparte lo presenta angel nieto que sale pilotando un avion.


Zentao, si no he puesto más información en el post era porque no eran horas para empezar a explicar nada, más cuando es un enlace que cada uno puede indagar por sí solo...

Lo que dices del documental, el primero te referirás a los grandes combates aéreos y es como dices, recrean por ordenador algunos combates buenísimos que sucedieron. Me encantó el de la guerra de Corea. Pero también lo vi falta de información...


menus excusas y currate un hilo con fotos videos enlaces y demas ,te lo digo de coña eh?
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Notapor syncho » 15 Oct 2007, 17:29

zentao 2.0 escribió:
syncho escribió:
zentao 2.0 escribió:me encanta el tema pero preferiria que pusieras un post mas masticao , por ciert que hay unos documentales de combates aereos contados por el ganador y con una reproduccion en 3d del combate,no pongo el link por que ahora no va, lo malo del documental es que solo salen ases americanos que ademas no se pueden comparar en derribos a otros ases.

tambien hay otro documental que se llama las alas alas de la fama que cuenta la historia de la aviacion española,parte de esta va muy unida a ramon franco y sus records de vuelo,aparte lo presenta angel nieto que sale pilotando un avion.


Zentao, si no he puesto más información en el post era porque no eran horas para empezar a explicar nada, más cuando es un enlace que cada uno puede indagar por sí solo...

Lo que dices del documental, el primero te referirás a los grandes combates aéreos y es como dices, recrean por ordenador algunos combates buenísimos que sucedieron. Me encantó el de la guerra de Corea. Pero también lo vi falta de información...


menus excusas y currate un hilo con fotos videos enlaces y demas ,te lo digo de coña eh?


Ya lo sé hombre, lo que tenía pensado era que entre todos pusieramos ases de la guerra de todo los tiempos y así podríamos participar todos. Vamos, yo lo veo mejor así, pero es que lo que dices es un curro de cojones, eh... :D
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Notapor zentao 2.0 » 15 Oct 2007, 17:41

pes empiezo yo, pero como estoy vago me limito a copiar y pegar:
LA MUERTE DEL BARÓN ROJO



En el calor de la batalla por el dominio del aire, durante la Primera Guerra Mundial, en una época en que la expectativa de vida de un piloto era de tres semanas, los jóvenes aviadores de ambos bandos se protegían con amuletos para la buena suerte y se rodeaban de supersticiones. Entre los aviadores alemanes que pilotaban máquinas voladoras hechas con lona y cuerdas, se creía en una superstición, la más importante de todas: no ser fotografiado antes de una misión. Sólo tras cumplirlas, los pilotos permitían que una cámara fotográfica registrara sus victorias.

El 21 de abril de 1918 por la mañana, el barón Manfred von Richthofen. el más mortífero de los ases que la guerra aérea haya conocido jamás, se burló de esa superstición. Se detuvo para jugar con un perrito en la puerta del hangar que albergaba su triplano Fokker, pintado de rojo brillante. Y entonces sonrió al objetivo de una cámara, sostenida par un visitante del campo de aviación.

El barón van Richthofen podía permitirse el lujo de desafiar la superstición. Después de todo, a los 25 años de edad, era el más famoso aviador del mundo. Se lo consideraba casi invencible. El día anterior había derribado su avión número ochenta. Era un héroe nacional, conocido comO El Caballero Rojo de Alemania o el Barón Rojo, a causa del «circo aéreo» que lanzaba dos veces cada día sobre los cielos de Francia y Bélgica. Allí, causaba estragos entre los aviones británicos, franceses, australianos y canadienses.

Richthofen subió a la carlinga de su Fokker a las 10.15 de esa mañana, mientras la banda militar tocaba himnos en honor de sus victorias. Despegó del campo de aviación de Cappy seguido por dos docenas de aviones, y voló hacia el pueblo de Sailly-le Sec, en el valle del Somme, donde volverían a reunirse. Más o menos al mismo tiempo, mientras Richthofen comenzaba a mover su avión por la pista de despegue, otro piloto se estaba preparando para levantar vuelo, en Bertangles, a 40 km de allí. Se llamaba Roy Brown, y era un canadiense de 24 años de edad, piloto de un Sopwith Camel del Escuadrón 209, de la recién formada RAF. Brown, aviador voluntario, nacido en Toronto, era muy distinto al extravagante Barón Rojo, con quien poco después iba a enfrentarse en combate.

Retraído y modesto, Brown se había apuntado ya la muerte de doce oficiales alemanes, y llegaría a apuntarse un número mayor, aunque rara vez se preocupara de remarcar sus victorias individuales. Recientemente, Brown había sido ascendido a capitán y recibido la condecoración Cruz de los Pilotos Distinguidos. Estaba cumpliendo dos peligrosas misiones cada día de la semana, y mantenía en forma su cuerpo cansado con constantes infusiones de leche y coñac. Brown había oído hablar mucho del barón von Richthofen, y respetaba a los pilotos de su asombroso «circo aéreo». Por su parte, van Richthofen no había escuchado hablar jamás del capitán Brown, el hombre que, a las 11.15 de esa mañana, estaba ya volando a 3.000 m por encima suyo, con uno de los 15 aviones de la RAF que combatían cerca de Sailly-le Sec.



Brown vio, debajo suyo, al poderoso circo rojo, que atacaba a dos lentos aviones de reconocimiento REB, que daban vueltas, girando y descendiendo en tirabuzones, en un intento de esquivar el ataque. Brown hizo entrar a su Camel en una abrupta picada y, en perfecto orden, siete de sus compañeros hicieron lo mismo. A lo sumo, tenían orden de arriesgar sólo ocho de los aviones que componían el asustado escuadrón. Mientras sus aviones rugían hacia el combate aéreo, a unos 1.000 m, los pilotos aliados sabían que estaban en clara inferioridad numérica con respecto a los alemanes, y que uno de los ocho aviones que se estaban uniendo en batalla sólo resultaba apto para dar un paseo.

Era el que pilotaba el alférez William May, un australiano que acababa de llegar a Francia y a quien se le había ordenado mantenerse al margen de cualquier combate aéreo hasta que hubiese adquirido una mayor experiencia. May estuvo girando alrededor del sitio donde se desarrollaba la contienda, y vio cómo los otro siete Camels atraían a los aviones alemanes para permitir que los dos asediados REB se refugiaran en un banco de nubes. Los escasos pilotos de la RAF estaban obteniendo un triunfo inesperado.

En cuestión de minutos, habían derribado cuatro aviones alemanes, uno de ellos alcanzado por los disparos del inexperto May. Pero nada más May despachó al aparato enemigo, el propio barón von Richthofen se precipitó hacia el avión del australiano para enfocarlo en la mira de sus armas. Las dos ametralladoras Spandau del Fokker rasgaron el fuselaje del avión de May. El piloto australiano sólo recibió heridas leves, pero se encontraba en un grave aprieto. Por más que lo intentaba, no podía sacudirse de su cola al Barón Rojo. Barrenó, giró, volvió a girar, pero era demasiado inexperto para superar al as alemán.

Brown advirtió lo que estaba sucediendo y abandonó el centro del combate aéreo. En ese momento, May estaba huyendo a todo gas; su avión volaba bajo y el barón estaba a sólo 25 metros detrás de él. Con la ventaja de la altura, Brown se precipitó hacia abajo, hasta que consiguió alcanzar al alemán. Su batería australiana abrió fuego sobre el avión de Richthofen, pero el barón continuó su caza con toda determinación.

Tan absorto estaba en la persecución de su presa, que el vencedor de ochenta batallas aéreas se olvidó de la primera regla que consta en el manual de aire: vigilar siempre la retaguardia. Brown estaba ya justamente sobre la cola de su avión, con la mano inmóvil sobre el gatillo de su ametralladora Vickers. El avión del Barón Rojo se puso en su mira y Brown abrió fuego: una larga ráfaga, que lanzó una precisa hilera de balas a lo largo del fuselaje del Fokker, comenzando en la cola y dispersándose en la cabina de mando. La proa del Fokker se inclinó hacia abajo y el avión planeó hacia tierra. Allí se estrelló, y siguió dando tumbos hasta detenerse cerca de las líneas británicas, en las afueras de Sally-le Sec.

Un soldado británico registró la carlinga y encontró al barón Manfred van Richthofen erguido en su asiento, muerto. Un oficial sacó una instantánea de la escena, para dejar caer copias sobre las líneas alemanas al día siguiente. Mientras tanto, en el campo de aviación de Cappy, un fotógrafo alemán estaba observando el cielo. Esperaba el regreso del «circo aéreo»; esperaba poder fotografiar ese día par segunda vez al siempre victorioso Barón Rojo.


naturalmente olvidan mencionar que desde tierra tambien le disparaban y que no se sabe quien lo mato,ademas de que el baron no era el mismo desde el balazo que le rozo la cabeza.
http://www.editorialbitacora.com/armage ... aron01.htm
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Notapor zentao 2.0 » 15 Oct 2007, 17:42

puto server.
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Notapor syncho » 15 Oct 2007, 18:37

Finnish Aces of WW2

Imagen

TOP


Vaino Ilmari Suhonen 19.5
Viktor Pyotsia 19.5 - 12
Erik Uolevi Teromaa 19
Lauri Olavi Pekuri 18.5 (POW 16jun44)
Jouko Armas Antero Huotari 17.5
"Pappa" Yrjo Olavi Turkka 17.5
"Zamba" Jorma Kalevi Sarvanto * * 16.83 ( 6 in 5 minutes * )
Aulis Lumme 16.5
Eero Juhani Riihikallio 16.5
Eero Martti Olavi Halonen 16.5 - 16
Martti Aslak Alho 15
Aaro Eerikki Nuorala 14.5
Heimo Olavi Lampi 13.5
Pekka Johannes Kokko 13.33 - 10
Yrjo Armas Pallasvuo 12.83
"Pelle" Pehr Erik Sovelius 12.75 - 7
Lasse Erik Aaltonen 12.67 - 8.5
Eino Eero Sakeus Koskinen 12.5
* Urho Kaarlo Sarjamo 12.5 (KIA 17jun44)
Onni Kullervo Paronen 12.5 - 9.5
Leo Ahokas 12
Ahti Tauno Ilmari Laitinen 12 (POW 29jun44)
Iikka Veikko Torronen 11.25 - 10.5
Hemmo Kullervo Leino 11
Urho Abraham Nieminen 11 - 6
* Niilo Johannes Erkinheimo 10.75 (KIFA 16nov43)
Martti Tauno Johannes Kalima 10.5
Kai Kalevi Johannes Metsola 10.5
Eino Iisakki Peltola 10.5
Kullervo Lahtela 10.25
Mikko Pasila 10
Veikko Johannes Karu 10 - 7

Mauno Ilmari Kirjonen 9.75
Viljo Ilmari Kauppinen 9.5 (WIA 7jun44)
* Paavo David Berg 9.5 - 4.5 (KIA 1nov41)
Jaakko Juho Hillo 8
Erik Edvard Lyly 8
Ture Allan Nestor Mattila 8
Joel Adiel Savonen 8
Martti Olavi Kalervo Inehmo 8 - 7
Aulis Nathanael Bremer 7.5
* Lauri Olavi Jutila 7.5 (KIA 17jun43)
Valio Valfrid Porvari 7.5 - 4.5
Kosti Koskinen 7
Nils Rudolf Trontti 7
Vaino Johannes Virtanen 7
Toivo Tomminen 6.5
Onni Ilmari Avikainen 6 (Hosp 10may44) TOP
Matti Ensio Durchman 6
Lars Paul Erich Hattinen 6
Tatu Mauri Huhanantti 6
Pauli Erik Salminen 6
Kelpo Jalmari Taimi Virta 6
Aarre Paivio Linnamaa 6 - 5
Aimo Emil Gerdt 5.83
Pentti Emil Nurminen 5.83
Sakari Heikki Ikonen 5.75 - 4
Osmo Kalervo Kauppinen 5.5
Kosti Rauni Keskinummi 5.5 (WIA 28jun44)
Paavo Kullervo Mellin 5.5 (POW 9mar42)
Mauno Mikael Frantila 5.5 - 4.5
Lauri Johannes Lautamaki 5.5 - 4
Gustaf Erik Magnusson 5.5 - 1.5
Aaro Jaakko Kiljunen 5.33
Veikko Toivo Rimminen 5.33 - 4
Pentti Teodor Tilli 5.17
Veikko Sakari Alpuro 5 (+4 obs. balloons)
* Veikko Arvid Evinen 5 (KIA 24/25jun44)
J. Hamalainen 5
* Jaakko Olavi Kajanto 5 (KIA 19mar43)
Arvo Ilmari Koskelainen 5
Vilppu Mikael Lakio 5
Osmo Lansivuori 5
Kim Konrad Lindberg 5
Atte Eirik Olavi Nyman 5
Vaino Nikolai Pokela 5
Pauli Aatos Massinen 5 - 4
Jouko Jalo Myllymaki 5 - 4
Erkki Olavi Ehrnrooth 5 - 2

Tenéis más imágenes de todas los aviones fineses en varios periodos, además de la WWII:

Imagen

He aquí un foro para informarse sobre las acciones de estas fuerzas durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial:

http://www.network54.com/Forum/46825/

THE FINNISH FIGHTER TACTICS AND TRAINING BEFORE AND DURING THE WW II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF FIGHTER TACTICS

The numerical growth of the Soviet Air Force in the 1930s was an essential factor in the operation plans of the Finnish Air Force, the FAF. The Soviet bomber force was a remarkable threat to the Finnish defence. It was obvious that the FAF had not forces enough for an offensive air war and therefore fighter defence was considered as a better line of operations (1).

The international trend was favouring the Douhet philosophy of bomber dominance, but the Finnish fighter leaders warned that there was no universal air doctrine because of the big differences in the various nations` resources. The Douhet theory demanded that the opponent country`s economic, social and industrial structure should be destroyed by bombers, and that was not possible for Finland in case of the Soviet Union. So, it was better not to listen to the superpowers` specialists, but to plan for the air defence and aim for the local and temporal air superiority.

The systematic fighter operations were started in the FAF in the beginning of the 1930s with the Gloster Gamecock fighters. Next came the Bristol Bulldogs and then, after the middle of the 1930s, the Fokker D XXIs.

The development of the fighter tactics was started in the fighter courses in the Suur-Merijoki and Utti Air Bases. The international practice in the fighter formation tactics in that time was to use big and tight formations, and the basic section was made of three fighters in the tight vic formation. The Finnish fighter pilots concluded that they would never have such big numbers of fighters from which they could build up those great squadron formations which were used abroad to concentrate fighter power to certain areas. They also concluded that big and tight fighter formations were tactically inefficient.

The most important element in the fighter combat was surprise, and that was the goal which always had to be tried to reach for. A big and tight formation could very seldom achieve the surprise because it was easily seen from far away and the pilots couldn`t keep good lookout while working to maintain their positions in the formation. On the other hand, a section with the two fighters about 100 - 150 yards away from each other, or the division with 300 - 400 yards between the two sections, were found to be very effective in the search exercises. This kind of formation tactics was adopted by the FAF during 1934 and 1935 and it became the standard method in the Finnish fighter units since then. Every pilot was free to keep a good lookout to every direction and also all the time to check the six of the other pilots. In addition to that this kind of small and loose formation was seen much later because all of its aircraft were not always at the same time in the view of the opponent. The search phase was heavily emphasized in the training and the ability in that was an important factor in the evaluation of the fighter pilot`s skill (2).

When the aerial engagement began every pilot was free to maneuver in the most effective way, so, both the attacks and the evasive maneuvers could be done without any delays. The flying in the small formations meant continuous fighting against bigger numbers but this could be compensated by always attacking regardless of numbers. The fighter combat generally spread quite quickly into section fights and duels where there was no immediate benefit of the bigger numbers. In these separate combats the better pilots always won. However, this philosophy demanded that every pilot was a skillful air combatant. This skill was trained for both in the fighter courses and in the squadrons.

One of the corner stones in the skill of the fighter pilot was the complete control of his aircraft. This was trained by aerobatics and combat maneuvers, and also by intentional mismaneuvering. In the classic one versus one and two versus two exercises and in the practice attacks on bomber targets the combat maneuvers were trained as instinctive actions. In practical exercises the simple maneuvers were found to be the best ones.

It was also found in training that one of the most important skills of the fighter pilot was the shooting accuracy; the ability to judge the right deflection during maneuvering, to estimate the right shooting distance and to concentrate the fire on the point target, for example on some vulnerable part of the target airplane. The shooting training became an essential, and in times dominating, part of the fighter training. The Käkisalmi air gunnery camp on the coast of Lake Ladoga was a big contributor to the shooting accuracy of the Finnish fighter pilots (3).

When the typical bomber formations were studied, they were found to be rather similar in their rear parts regardless of the size of the formation, so, 2 - 3 attack patterns were enough for various target formations. One typical exercise for the fighter sections was to approach the target formation from ahead about 1500 - 3000 feet higher, to make the simultaneous split-s and to end up in the shooting position behind the rearmost bombers. The camera-"fire" was first concentrated on the rear gunner and then on the vulnerable parts like engines and fuel tanks (2).

For the fighter combats as simple as possible maneuvers were developed. The most effective maneuvers were first planned and calculated on the paper and then tested in the air. It was noticed in the practice that the simple maneuvers were best in the duels and a couple of evasive movements were enough in all defensive situations (2).

To improve the training effectiveness the section, flight and squadron notebooks were used to analyze every exercise. This helped every pilot`s concentration on the training issue. One effective and cheap additional method to improve the shooting accuracy was the use of the paper parachutes as the aiming targets before air gunnery training (3).

In 1937 a new Air Warfare Manual was published and in that the experiences of the fighter courses and squadron training was utilized. The manual was, of course, much more general than the squadron and aircraft type specified directions, but it unified the fighter tactical principles. The following are some of the main points of the fighter operations given properly just before the Winter War (4):

"The fighter squadrons are used to limit the enemy air operations and to improve the functions of own flying units. The cover operations demand usually a big number of fighters. However, even a smaller, but qualitatively better, fighter force can accomplish a local and temporal air superiority. Also the mere existence of a fighter force makes the enemy air operations more difficult, because it complicates the enemy`s operation planning and aircraft type selection.

To achieve the temporal and local air superiority the fighter wings must be properly deployed, in high readiness and they must operate in a good cooperation with other flying units and the anti aircraft artillery.

The commander of the fighter unit must be an experienced air combatant, who is respected for his skill and authority. He is responsible for the unit`s good fighting spirit which is an absolute demand for the success.

Only a brave, disciplined, sacrificing, decisive and gutsy flyer is a good fighter pilot. The personnel of the fighter flights, divisions and sections must be chosen so that the pilots are used to cooperate with each other.

The fighter unit can be in rest, in readiness or in the immediate alert. In readiness the pilots get the additional information about the enemy and the weather. All the directions which can be given in this phase are told to the personnel. In alert the commander makes sure that everybody knows his tasks in the various phases of the air combat and also that all the signals are known.

The transition times from one status to another are:

* from rest to readiness 30 minutes
* from readiness to alert 20 minutes
* from alert to take off 2 minutes

The main missions of the fighters are:

* to deny the enemy`s air operations over the certain area
* to cover own operations

To deny the enemy`s air operations the fighters fly combat air patrols over certain areas either continuously or during preset times, or the fighters are in the alert in their bases. The cover of own operations can be direct or indirect.

In the offensive the mission of the fighters is first to deny the enemy`s air operations and then to cover the own surveillance and artillery fire control flights. In the defensive the main mission is to deny the enemy`s air operations.

To achieve the surprise the dead angles of the enemy must be used during the approach and the air combat. All aircraft which are not identified are taken at first as enemies.

The air combat is rather brief, so, mistakes which are made in the beginning of it are difficult to correct. Therefore the surprise is a decisive factor in the air combat. It is possible to plan ahead the combat methods and they are the better the more unknown they are to the enemy. The planning of the combat methods demands the detailed knowledge of the enemy`s weaponry and own training level.

The enemy aircraft can be tied into the air combat only if it is slower than the own fighter. The success of the attack depends on the weapon effect of the attacker compared to that of the defender. The weapon effectiveness and the vulnerability of the target are more important than the number of the weapons.

The weapon effectiveness depends essentially on the skill and accuracy of the shooter. Therefore the squadron and flight commanders must thoroughly know their pilots` shooting accuracy.

About the enemy aircraft must be known:

* max and min speed in the level flight
* climb rate at various altitudes
* the min radius and time of the 180 degrees turn
* the min radius of 360 degrees turn
* the time of the 180 degrees hammerhead turn
* the radius and time of the pull up to the vertical attitude
* the additional height after the pull up
* the radius of the recovery at the various speeds
* the increase of the speed in the vertical and 45 degrees dive
* the time of deceleration from the max speed to cruising speed
* the time of acceleration from the cruise to the max speed
* dead angles

The attack method is based on the opponent`s defence capabilities and vulnerability. The opponent`s lines of fire must be known as follows:

* the lines of fire and those directions which limit or eliminate the opponent`s shooting possibilities
* the hitting probabilities of the opponent at various ranges and directions
* the rates of fire and the number and the location of weapons of the opponent
* the size of the magazines of the weapons and the time required for the change of the magazines
* the possibilities to concentrate the fire to different directions
* the possibilities of the opponent to hit back during the attack

Usually the simplest attack method is also the best one. The attack method depends very much on the approach possibilities. The best way is to start the combat from a direction which permits to watch the opponent all the time also after the break.

When the targets are fighters, the surprise is very important. The look out during the search must be arranged to achieve the surprise. During the search the own fighters fly in divisions with 1 000 - 2 000 yards distance while communicating via radio. When the enemies have been found, it is best to approach from ahead or from behind, because the approach from the side is more easily observed. The enemy has the worst evasive possibilities when the attack is done with a very small height difference from behind and below.

If the surprise is not achieved and the enemy attacks when the own division is still climbing, the climb must be continued with evasive maneuvers as long as there are enemy aircraft overhead.

The air combats between fighter formations usually spread into a vast area. The best vantage points are achieved by flying at the edge of the combat area and higher than the others.

The attack from above is usually successful only if the surprise is achieved. If the surprise is not probable it is better not to attack with all fighters simultaneously. By attacking one by one the own fighters can protect each other during the dive. Also, the fighters further back in line can get good firing opportunities when the targets have made evasive breaks and lost some of their speed.

In the fighter combats the climb rate is more important than the level speed. Also, the formation with altitude advantage can convert the altitude to speed if the enemy tries to escape.

The best way to attack the bomber targets is to approach from ahead and above and then to make a dive attack via split-s."

Although the field manual didn`t give any fighter type oriented directions, it contained rather detailed tactics and methods. The goal was to standardize and systematize the training in the fighter squadrons and courses.


The Winter War

Imagen

(An extract from the draft of an untitled book on the history of fighter technology and tactics. Ó Robert L. Shaw)
After the Germans occupied most of Poland late in 1939, the Soviets, although under a non-aggression pact with the Germans, became concerned regarding the possibility of an invasion by their unlikely bed-fellows. Of special concern was the existence of a less-than-friendly Finland on their northern border, which might be persuaded to allow such an invasion through their territory. There was also the threat of an amphibious invasion up the Gulf of Finland to Leningrad. Finland had become independent from Russia late in the First World War, with a southern border only about 25 mi from Leningrad (St. Petersburg). The Soviets demanded the Finns concede territory, primarily in the Karelian isthmus adjacent to Leningrad, as well as some strategic islands in the Gulf of Finland and a naval base on the southern Finnish coast, to provide a defensible buffer for the Motherland. These demands amounted to less than 1% of Finland, and in return the Russians offered to exchange about twice this territorial area elsewhere along the border. Largely out of principle and a deep mistrust of the Soviets, the Finns refused. When negotiations broke down, the Soviets invaded on 30 November 1939.

The Soviets committed over 900 aircraft and almost a million troops, outnumbering the Finns by some 3-to-1 on the ground and nearly 9-to-1 in the air, and expected an easy victory. The Finnish Air Force (FAF), or Ilmavoimat, possessed fewer than fifty operational fighters, about 18 British Blenheim bombers, and an assortment of some sixty mostly obsolete close-support, reconnaissance and liaison aircraft. Primary among these were Fokker CX and Blackburn Ripon 2-seater biplanes. A stiff Finnish resistance and brutal winter weather, however, quickly halted the advance, with great Soviet losses.

Probably because of their over-confidence, the Red Air Force did not initially commit their best aircraft to the Finnish invasion, which was to be known as the Winter War. Their fighter forces were equipped primarily with I-15bis biplanes and I-16 Type 5, 6, and 10 monoplanes, and the bombers were mostly SB-2 and DB-3 types. As these fighter types have been covered in detail earlier, we will concentrate more closely on the Finnish fighters, of which there were just two squadrons. One of these was equipped with about ten serviceable, but quite obsolete British Bulldog IVA biplanes.

The second squadron comprised 36 more capable Fokker D.XXI low-wing monoplanes with fixed, streamlined gear and enclosed cockpits. The Finns had bought seven of these fighters from the Dutch in 1937, about a year prior to their operation by the Dutch Air Force, and completed about 35 more under license prior to the Winter War. Of mixed construction, the fuselage had a steel-tube structure covered by metal forward and on top of aft fuselage, the rest being fabric covered. The wing structure was of wood covered by bakelite and plywood, and fitted with hydraulic flaps. The first Finnish Fokkers were powered by Polish-built supercharged Bristol Mercury VII radial engines equipped with a 3-blade metal ground-adjustable props. The Finnish-built Fokkers were fitted with essentially identical locally built Mercury VIII motors. Armament included two synchronized FN Browning 7.9mm machine guns in the cowl, and two more in the wings, aimed with the aid of telescopic sights. The Fokker also offered a much more stable gun platform than their Russian opponents.

One of these aircraft was fitted experimentally with a 20mm cannon under each wing in place of the machine guns, but the poor reliability and performance of these weapons prevented their being installed on additional Fokkers. Their heavy recoil also shook the aircraft badly, and the reduced rate of fire and lower accuracy did not suit the Finns' almost radical passion for pin-point gunnery.

The FAF had purchased 17 Bulldog IVAs early in 1935, upgraded with the Mercury VI.S2 engine which provided much improved speed and climb performance over the standard RAF Bulldogs. Other modifications included a NACA cowl and enhancements intended to improve arctic operations, like heated guns. As can be seen in Table 20-1, the Finnish Bulldogs were quite competitive with the Russian biplane fighters early in the war, but were hopelessly outclassed in every respect except maneuverability by the enemy monoplanes. Unable to catch the fast Soviet bombers, they were not really a factor in the air conflict, although Bulldog pilots did claim some victories.

The Fokkers, however, were quite competitive with the Russian monoplanes in both speed and climb performance, and in armament. These figures might be slightly optimistic, however, because the Fokkers were fitted with skis throughout the Winter War, as were many of the Soviet aircraft. I-16 Types 5/6 were often fitted with non-retractable skis, while the Type 10 and later variants could be equipped with semi-retractable skis. The slightly lower wing loading of the I-16s conferred marginally better turn performance on the Soviet monoplanes, which were also better armored. The Fokker was considerably heavier than the Russian fighters, and therefore had better initial acceleration in a dive. So, even with a top dive speed of only about 320 mph, somewhat below that of the I-16, the Fokkers could usually escape from the Soviet monoplane if necessary. Compared with the Soviet biplane fighter, the Fokker was considerably faster and climbed better, but the I-15bis was much more maneuverable.

Of more importance than the rough parity in equipment quality, however, was the relative quality of pilot training and combat leadership. Although the Red Air Force had considerable recent combat experience in both Spain and the Far East, and their top commanders were Spanish War veterans, the Soviets did not initially commit their most experienced units to the Winter War.

The Red Air Force command structure was also disastrous. In mid-1937 a so-called "dual-command," or "collegiate control" arrangement was instituted in which political commissars were assigned to each unit with status equal to that of the tactical commanders. Field commanders were obligated to submit their plans and decisions to political councils comprised of these commissars, which had veto powers. The political councils could also recommend demotions, reprimands, etc., which, during this period of Stalin's purges, were tantamount to death sentences. As can be imagined, such a system severely undermined command confidence, innovation, and effectiveness.

In 1938 the Red Air Force had been reorganized. The mixed Air Brigades had been abolished and homogeneous Air Regiments of about sixty aircraft each had been established. For bombers this included fast bombers, dive bombers, light bombers, and close-support bombers, normally arranged in five squadrons of 12 aircraft each. Fighter and ground-attack regiments typically comprised four squadrons of 15 aircraft. Seldom were regiments up to full strength, however, with fighter regiments typically having some 48 aircraft and bombers about 36. Four to six Air Regiments were normally combined into Air Divisions. Each military district was assigned fighter and bomber divisions composed of homogeneous units, but the "Army Air Forces" were also retained, with each army provided a composite division. This system inevitably led to fragmentation of control.

In spite of recommendations of Spanish veterans to adopt the German 4-aircraft, two-pair tactical unit, the Red Air Force had retained the old 3-plane Zven'ya doctrine. In contrast, the Finns had no combat experience, but were tactically quite innovative and benefited from sending pilots on exchange tours with other air forces, such as Germany and France. As early as 1935, they had adopted the flight of four fighters, operated in two pairs. This is essentially the Fighting Wing, Finger-Four fighter doctrine, the development of which is normally credited to Moelders and the German Condor Legion in Spain several years later, as discussed in a previous chapter. FAF doctrine was quite advanced, and included a "first see, first shoot" policy, by which a wingman was authorized to attack an enemy before his leader if he was in the best position to do so. The Finns were also quite aggressive, with an "attack regardless of numbers" policy, which normally provided them with the initiative in air combat.

Such a doctrine, although quite efficient, requires a high degree of training throughout the pilot corps, a fact realized and taken seriously by the Finns. Their training included a heavy emphasis on air-to-air gunnery and strafing; acceptance into a fighter squadron required a pilot to demonstrate an incredible 75% hits in strafe. In addition to the usual air-to-air gunnery training firing against towed targets, the Finns also employed a more unusual technique. They would release a small paper parachute from the cockpit, then maneuver to keep it in sight and make multiple firing runs against it.

To aid gunnery accuracy the Finns as policy harmonized their guns to converge at about 150 yds range. With guns widely separated in both the cowl and wings, bullets tend to achieve a very sparse pattern at target range if all are pointed straight ahead, much like a shotgun. By harmonizing all the guns so that their rounds converged to a point, the effect was greatly increased "bullet density" at the chosen range. Inside a distance slightly greater than this convergence range, the concentration of projectiles is much more dense, more akin to rifle fire. Harmonization rewards excellent marksmanship and close-range fire. Because the rounds tend to diverge outside convergence range, however, long-range fire is actually penalized. Those with poor marksmanship skills who expect to take random long-range "Hail-Mary" gun shots, are substantially better off without harmonization. The Soviets, not incidentally, did not harmonize their guns at this time.

Another interesting practice of the Finns was to load the right-hand synchronized cowl machine gun totally with tracers to assits in correcting the bullet stream. The other three guns were typically loaded with incendiary and armor-piercing ammo.

Not only were the Soviets still employing an outdated 3-plane fighter tactical doctrine, normally without the benefit of radios, but their overall level of pilot training was quite low, even though there were some experienced pilots available. As an illustration, it was not uncommon for wingmen to follow their leader around during an engagement and fire their guns whenever he did, whether they were pointed in the general vicinity of an enemy aircraft or not.

During the Winter War, the Finnish fighters normally dispersed in small numbers to auxiliary camouflaged airfields to avoid detection and attack on the ground. Standing alert for reports of Russian bombers, they often flew 6-8 sorties each day. When not flying, their aircraft were covered and kept warm by the use of electric radiators and heated oil dipsticks, and could be airborne in a matter of minutes.

On the first day of the war, the Soviets bombed Helsinki and many other cities, expecting the Finns to surrender. When this did not occur immediately, the Russian bombers switched to transportation facilities, such as railway junctions and harbors. Early in the war the Soviet bombers typically flew at medium altitudes in formations of 3-9, usually without fighter escort, and suffered heavy losses. Russian bomber crews reportedly showed a high degree of air discipline, staying together for mutual protection at all costs. For instance, if one bomber was crippled, the entire flight would slow down so it could remain in formation.

The primary Soviet bombers of the Winter War, the Tupolev SB-2, discussed earlier in conjunction with their service in Spain and the Far East, and the larger and slightly slower Ilyushin DB-3, were both relatively fast aircraft with twin radial engines. Speed was their primary defense; they were impervious to the Finnish Bulldog biplanes and even the Fokkers had only a 30-40 mph speed margin. Without an initial altitude advantage, the Fokkers often had a long chase to close with a bomber formation.

Once engaged, however, the Russian bombers seriously under-armed, with only two light machine gun covering the rear hemisphere; one of these guns was mounted on top, the other on the belly. Unfortunately, there was only one gunner, so he had to scramble from one gun to the other as the attacking fighters changed position, so it was effectively one puny rifle-caliber gun against the entire firepower of the attacker. The Finns were methodical and relentless in their attacks, often closing well within 100 ft and concentrating on the gunner first, then the engines and fuel tanks. Still, the Soviet bombers were well armored against light machine gun fire, and each attack often consumed considerable time and ammunition.

The Finnish fighters initially concentrated on protecting their troops enroute to the front, then shifted to air defense. After the first two days of the conflict, terrible winter weather closed in, effectively ending flight operations for about two weeks. During December the Finns frantically appealed to the world for help; fighter aircraft were purchased from every available source. The first to begin arriving even before the end of the year were Italian Fiat G.50 monoplanes from an order of 25 placed late in October, although these did not begin to be available in useful numbers until mid-February. An order of thirty Gloster Gladiator Mk II biplanes began arriving in mid-January and were immediately pressed into service to replace the old Bulldogs, which were finally withdrawn in early February; the entire order of Gladiators was on hand by mid-February. The delivery of thirty Morane-Saulnier M.S.406 monoplanes donated by France also occurred during February. In addition, beginning in early March, the Finns began to take delivery of the first of 44 Brewster F2A-1 (actually the B-239 export variant) Buffaloes purchased from the U.S. Navy and assembled in Sweden by Norwegian mechanics. Only a handful of these fighters, however, were available before the end of the conflict. Likewise, delivery of ten Hawker Hurricanes during early March came too late. Other assistance was provided beginning in early January by a Swedish detachment of a dozen Gladiators and four Hawker Hart light biplane bombers that operated in the Lapland region to the north. There were also a half dozen Danish volunteer fighter pilots who flew along side the Finns, as well as a few other foreign volunteers.

Of this mixed bag of fighter types, the Fokkers, primarily due to their larger numbers during the Winter War, were most successful, claiming a 16-to-1 kill ratio. Finnish claims were predominantly against Soviet bombers and, although all air-combat claims should be taken with much seasoning, theirs are probably more reliable than most, since a high percentage occurred over friendly territory where wreckage could be confirmed.

Next in effectiveness, again primarily because of higher numbers available earlier in the conflict, were the Gladiators. Their claims were also predominantly against bombers, but the biplanes were more effective against the Russian fighters. Although relatively under-powered and slower than the Soviet monoplanes, the Gladiators could out-turn any of their opponents, which made them dangerous in a dogfight, especially against inexperienced pilots. Because of their better maneuverability, the Gladiators typically took off first and landed last in order to cover the takeoff and landing of the monoplanes. The shortcomings of the Gladiator were quickly evident, as their loss rate was alarming. Their light armament was only marginally effective against the armored Soviet aircraft and their lack of a firewall made them susceptible to flaming in the air.

Neither were the Soviets standing still during this period. After initial heavy bomber losses, they introduced some 500 additional aircraft in January, and began to escort their bombers on a regular basis. Newer fighters were committed, including the I-153 biplanes and I-16 Type 18 monoplanes. At this time, the Red Air Force was concentrating on supporting their ground forces which had bogged down on the Karelian front.

This I-153, just recently introduced and blooded in Mongolia, was described earlier in conjunction with its service against the Japanese. By the time of its introduction in Finland, however, most Chaikas were fitted with their intended powerplants comprising the 1000-hp Shvetsov M-62 radial engine with 2-speed supercharger, based on the Wright Cyclone R-1820G-5, and the AV-1 2-position hydraulic variable-pitch propeller. This was a brute of a fighter, as can be seen in Table 20-1. Among Finnish fighters at this point in the war, only the Gladiator was slightly more maneuverable; but the Chaika's big engine, more powerful than any available to the Finns, conferred superior performance in every other respect to the Finnish biplane. In fact, the Chaika was nearly as fast as the Finnish monoplanes. When employed properly, the I-153 was very effective during the Winter War.

The I-16 Type 18, like most of the Chaikas, was powered by the M-62 engine. In addition, the Type 18 was the first Soviet fighter to be equipped with the new AV-1 propeller as standard equipment, although some earlier I-16 versions were retrofitted with this device.

The Type 18, except for the new powerplant and the resulting higher weight, was otherwise very similar to the I-16 Type 10, still armed with four machine guns. Its speed was comparable to that of the best of the fighters available to the Finns, and it possessed the best climb performance in the theater. In addition, the Type 18's turn performance was as good as any of the Finnish monoplanes, but, of course, markedly inferior to the Gladiator. This combination of traits made the I-16 Type 18 probably the best Russian fighter of the Winter War.

By mid-February, the newly arrived Finnish monoplane fighters began to play significant roles in the air war. The best of these was probably the Fiat G.50, which could claim title to the fastest fighter in the theater during this period, but only by a very slim, insignificant margin. Both the Fiat and the Morane M.S.406 had comparable top speeds and superior dive performance relative to even the best Russian fighters, but, as can be seen in Table 20-1, they were significantly under-powered by r comparison, which resulted in inferior climb performance. Also having slightly higher wing loadings than the I-16s, these imports suffered from inferior turn performance, particularly in sustained engagements during which they would tend to loose speed and altitude (i.e., energy) faster. To make matters worse, both fighters were not well designed for such cold weather, and had significant maintenance and operational problems. Alone among the more modern Finnish fighters, the Fiat's open cockpit also placed it's pilot in the same uncomfortable accommodations as his Soviet counterparts, and like most other fighters available to the Finns, it had no armor protection. The Morane did have light pilot seat armor, but it was found to be only marginally effective against Soviet ammunition.

The somewhat improved top speeds of these new retractable-gear fighters was an advantage, however, in comparison with the Fokkers in running down Russian bombers; the greatest object of the Finns' attentions. Unlike the French version of the M.S.406, which sported an engine-mounted 20mm Hispano cannon firing through the prop hub, in the imported Moranes the cannon was replaced by a light 7.5mm Chatellerault machine gun to match the pair installed in the wings. With only three rifle-caliber guns, the Finnish Morane was well under-armed. The Fiats, on the other hand, were better equipped for dueling with bombers; the Italian fighters were fitted with a pair of synchronized 12.7mm Breda-SAFAT heavy machine guns in the cowl. These heavier weapons were much more effective against the armor protection of both the Soviet bombers and fighters.

Along with committing increased numbers of aircraft, the Soviets modified their tactics somewhat after the first days of the conflict. Along with supporting their stalemated ground forces and bombing transportation facilities, they shifted much of their bombers' attentions to the Finnish fighter airfields...when they could be found. The Finns, in response, shifted operating locations often. The size of the Russian bomber formations also increased significantly, and they were escorted regularly. Later in the war it was not uncommon for raids of a hundred bombers to be mounted, with a like number of fighter escorts. In good weather, the Russians could operate as many as 1,000 sorties per day.

The Finnish tactics called for the first interceptors on scene to engage the Soviet escort fighters, so those arriving later could have a clear go at the bombers. The Soviet bombers also began to fly at higher altitudes, which made interception more difficult, but also reduced bombing accuracy. There were, in addition, regular night bombing raids. The Fokkers attempted only one interception mission on a bright moonlit night. Without the aid of any sort of air direction system, however, this effort failed.

Because of their low numbers, the Fokkers flew mostly in pairs. Occasionally during large bomber raids or to protect ground operations, they mounted formations of 15-20, sometimes mixed with Gladiators. The fighter pairs normally patrolled in a fairly wide, nearly line-abreast formation, and typically attacked in trail. In addition to bomber interception the Finnish fighters flew protective patrols over their troops and engaged in ground strafing attacks. Their obsolete close-support aircraft could only operated effectively under conditions of air superiority. Even the fast Blenheim bombers were poorly protected and generally required fighter escort. As in most air conflicts over friendly territory, Finnish fighters were at considerable peril to ground fire from their own troops when operating at low altitudes.

The Soviets, with the advantage of numbers, normally flew in much larger formations, typically 6-30 fighters. As they were usually on the offensive, the Russians often also enjoyed the initial altitude advantage. One of their favorite tactics was known as the "Spanish Circle," from its origins in the Spanish Civil War. A number of I-16s would form a circle over Finnish fighters, with each taking turns performing dive-and-zoom attacks. The Finns were forced to make continual hard defensive turns to defeat successive attacks from different directions, eventually running them out of airspeed, altitude, and ideas. The best defense was usually an early diving escape attempt. The Finnish fighters also adopted this tactic from the Soviets.

Late in February, the Soviets committed about 500 additional aircraft to the Finnish campaign in preparation for a massive ground offensive, bringing their total to over 2,000 aircraft, including nearly a thousand bombers and about 500 fighters. This force represented nearly half the strength of the entire Red Air Force. Meanwhile, the FAF had grown to nearly 200 planes, with the average of better quality than at the start of the war, but the number serviceable remained fairly constant at nearer a hundred.

At the end of February the Finns suffered their worst losses of any single engagement of the air war when the Soviets mounted a well-coordinated fighter attack on one of their major bases. Just as the mixed squadron of fifteen Fokkers and Gladiators was taking off to intercept a reported bomber raid, some 40 I-16s and I-153s converged on their field almost simultaneously from three directions for a strafing attack. In the wild, low-altitude melee that followed, the Finns lost five Gladiators and a Fokker, while confirming eight Russian fighters, including an I-153 by ground fire. Following this engagement the Finnish Gladiators were relegated to reconnaissance missions only.

The following day the Russians began their final ground assault, and for the next two weeks the Finnish fighters were engaged primarily in strafing attacks for the first time, throwing in everything they had in an attempt to stem the Red tide surging across the ice of the Bay of Viipuri. Early in the offensive the element of surprise and poor weather prevented the Soviets from providing effective anti-aircraft fire or air cover for their troops, and these strafing attacks wreaked havoc. Later, however, Russian anti-aircraft increased greatly and the weather improved somewhat, allowing better fighter cover. These defenses, along with the ever-present "friendly fire" of Finnish ground troops, increased FAF loss rates.

By mid-March it was obvious that the Soviet offensive could not be stopped, and the Finns were forced into an armistice, accepting the Russian terms. As a result, Finland lost substantially more territory than the Soviets had at first demanded, including Viipuri (Vyborg), their second largest city. During this short, but vicious conflict, the FAF reportedly lost 60-70 aircraft, about equally distributed between air and ground losses, plus about the same number severely damaged. In addition, the Swedes lost six planes. Soviet aircraft losses have been estimated at 700-900; the Finns actually claimed only r about 240 in air combat, with some 80 more "probables," while the ground forces claimed 330 downed. FAF claims were overwhelmingly against Russian bombers. Of the original Finnish Fokkers, only eleven were lost; nine to enemy action, one to "friendly" ground r fire, another in an operational accident. Most of the rest went on to serve again a little over a year later in the Continuation War.

The Winter War, although it lasted less than four months, illustrates some important points regarding air combat. One of the most important is that the numbers of aircraft on each side do not tell the whole story. In this conflict, the Soviets enjoyed an approximate 10-1 advantage in aircraft, but LOST aircraft in combat at roughly the same ratio. Still, they ultimately won the war. As we have seen in previous air wars, particularly in WW-I, quantity is typically much better correlated with the final outcome of a conflict than with aircraft exchange ratios. If the side with superior numbers is willing and able to make good on its losses, it can accomplish its goals in support of the overall effort and eventually achieve victory. The price, however, may be great.

In this conflict, the Soviets had the overwhelming advantage of numbers, and at least parity, if not a slight edge in quality with respect to fighter designs for most of the war. In addition, they had the advantage of holding both the strategic and tactical initiative in most cases. This usually allowed them to benefit from the element of surprise, concentration of numbers during a given engagement, and an initial altitude advantage. Another plus was the combat experience, at least at higher command levels, of the Russians in Spain and the Far East. This latter advantage was more than offset, however, by an inefficient command structure, low morale, and a general lack of experience among aircrews during much of the conflict.

The Finns, on the other hand, could also claim rough parity in fighter quality, a much higher overall level of aircrew training, high morale, and a more efficient and effective fighter employment doctrine. Also, as they typically were based much closer to the air action, the FAF could generate more combat sorties per aircraft than the Soviets, who were forced to waste much more time just transiting back and forth to the combat arena. This factor has a powerful force-multiplying effect on the "density" of aircraft that can be engaged in combat at any time with a given total number of aircraft. Operating mostly over friendly territory, the Finns were also less likely to lose downed aircrew; and those that survived returned to combat much wiser, with the effect of increasing the overall level of aircrew experience over time.

The general availability of radios to the FAF was another important factor. Finnish Fokkers were normally equipped with indigenous P-12-17/1 radios. Flight leaders usually had very low-power transmitters with a range of only about 3 mi for coordinating within their flights, while the wingmen generally had only receivers. A system of trained air observers had been established before the Winter War, using telephones to call the squadron headquarters, which were equipped with radios for notifying airborne fighters. The telephone system was not well developed, however, which often resulted in significant sighting delays. Even though the Finns did not have a very effective air-direction system during the Winter War, they were often able to receive engagement and sighting reports that were valuable in allowing them to concentrate their limited forces where they were most needed.

Although it is often dangerous to draw sweeping conclusions from limited air conflicts, the Winter War illustrates many critical principles that will be reinforced throughout the history of air combat.


THE FLIGHT TRAINING SYSTEM
Air Academy (5)

The reserve pilot training was started in the Air Academy in September 1931. The age limit was from 17 to 25 years and the needed education was a high school graduate. The students were selected from a big number of applicants and a good physical condition and an earlier aviation hobby were benefits for the applicant.

The aviation subjects contained 275 hours of lectures and 200 hours of exercises. The most important subjects were:

* flying techniques 20 h
* engine theory 40 h
* aircraft structure 40 h + 30 h
* navigation 30 h
* weaponry and air gunnery 28 h + 12 h
* air warfare 32 h
* telegraph and radio technics 20 h + 117 h

Other special subjects included flying regulations, meteorology, signal theory, photography and military geography. The program contained 20 subjects with 40 % of lectures and 60 % of exercises. The flight hours per student were 50 hours.

The program was modified in 1934. Aerodynamics was added to the program as well as more hours to air warfare and tactics, engine and aircraft structure, weaponry and air gunnery and photography. The flight hours per student were 62 hours and in addition to that there was a special navigation training for 16 hours.

The next modifications in the elementary training came as follows:

* the night flight training was started in 1936
* the air gunnery training was started in 1937
* the flight hours for aerobatics and formation flying were added in 1938
* the air combat training was started in 1938

During the years 1931 - 1939 there were 8 reserve pilot courses and the total number of students was 240. 113 of these became professional military pilots after attending the cadet course.

The training for non-commissioned reserve pilots was started in 1934. The aviation subjects and the flight hours in the program were basically the same as in the reserve officers` courses. During 1934 - 1939 there were 5 non-commissioned reserve pilot courses with a total of 129 students. 74 of these became professional military pilots after advanced training.

About half of the reserve pilots were called to rehearsal training which was concentrated on the air combat maneuvers and air gunnery. The number of flight hours per student was 25.

An important supporter to the FAF in the flight training was Finland`s Air Defence Association. It arranged, in cooperation with the FAF, the flight courses for the international FAI A-license. The students were selected together with the Air Force, and Air Force instructors flew the check flights. The FAF also gave aircraft and instructors to the Association for training periods. Most of the students continued their training in the Air Force courses and quite many of the later fighter aces came in the Air Force via Finland`s Air Defence Association`s flight courses.

The total number of the trained reserve pilots before the Winter War was 320 (6).


Squadrons

The training in the squadrons was concentrated on the air combat and attacks on the bomber targets. The pilot had to know his fighter thoroughly and this was practiced in aerobatics and formation flights. The gun camera was used in the air combat training and also small paper parachutes were used as the aiming targets. Air gunnery was emphasized in the training program and shooting exercises at the target sleeve took 95 % of the total gunnery program. The standard practice was to analyze every day`s exercises together in the evening (7).

There were fuel shortages during the last years of the 1930s and therefore clear priorities were set on the training program. The fighter combat maneuvers and air gunnery became the most important exercises. For example in 1939 every fighter pilot flew 15 - 20 hours in the air gunnery training. Many pilots told afterwards that it had been much easier to shoot down the enemy aircraft than to hit the small target sleeve over Lake Ladoga. The good self confidence which was acquired from the air gunnery camps and air combat training was the basis for the Finnish fighter pilots` success in the Winter War (3).


Imagen


Más fuentes bibliográficas:

Sources

1) Mikko Uola: The Finnish Air Force 1918 - 1939, Arvi A. Karisto, 1975

2) Richard Lorentz: Strikes in the Air, summary

3) G. Magnusson: Comment about Lorentz`s summary, 3.9.1953

4) Air Warfare Manual, Nr 185/III/6 c secr/17.12.37

5) Martti Peltonen: History of the Air Academy 1918 - 1980, Air Force Academy Guild, 1993

6) Order of 2 Wing, Nr 13, Office II 349/II/3b 27.2.40

7) Eino A. Rahka: Flight Commander`s Memories, Helsinki 28.10.1980

8) Olavi Seeve: Air War between Finland and the Soviet Union 1939 - 1940, Air Force Staff, Nr 90/III/Helsinki 17.1.1941

9) Jorma Sarvanto: As a fighter pilot over Karelia, Vammala, 1941

10) 2 Wing document 472/II/ 4 a secr 9.5.1941

11) Ilmari Juutilainen: Double Fighter Knight, Apali Oy, Tampere, 1996

12) 2 Wing document 385/II/ 3 d 4.3.1940

13) Kyösti Karhila: Diary Nr 1, 10.12.39 - 1.5.40

14) Eino Luukkanen: As a fighter pilot in two wars, WSOY, 1955

15) Eino A. Rahka: 35 Training Squadrons Program, summary

16) Carl-Erik Bruun: The History of 26 Fighter Squadron, 1991

17) Air Staff document 31/ III L/ 2c 4.1.1942

18) Air Staff document 1406/III L/ c secr 1.9.1941

19) Air Staff document 1817/ III L/ 4c secr 29.9.1941

20) Air Staff document 2176/ III L/ 4c secr 26.10.1941

21) Air Staff document 46/ III L/ 4c secr 4.1.1942

22) 3 Wing operations 22.6.1941 - 4.9.1944

23) 1 Wing document 410/ II/ 5 10.7.42

24) 2 Wing operations, Air Staff document T 19280

25) Air Staff document 2855/III/ 2c secr 27.7.1942

26) Air Staff document 1377/ Ye.3/ 3b secr 5.4.1943

27) Air Staff document 1811/ Ye.3/ 3b secr 3.5.1943

28) Air Staff document 2313/ Ye.3/ 3b secr 5.6.1943

29) Air Staff document 3160/ Ye.3/ 3b secr 1.9.1943

30) Air Staff document 3369/ Ye.3/ 3b secr 27.9.1943

31) Air Staff document 1646/ Ye.3/ 3b secr 12.5.1844

La Defensa Aérea Finesa.

En 1937 Finlandia había comenzado un plan que duraría cinco años y que estaba destinado a la compra de "interceptores", porque se suponía que cualquier atacante enviaría grandes masas de bombarderos con poca o ninguna escolta. Debido al clima prebélico, se tuvo que recurrir a las fuentes más peregrinas para adquirir ese material, siendo dificil comprarlo a las primeras potencias europeas por dicho ambiente.

El primer acuerdo importante se firma con la holandesa Fokker, que les vende 7 Fokker DXXXI y les da la licencia para producir 35 más. El 30 de noviembre de 1939 los fineses sólo han recibido dos tercios de los cazas. El 30 de noviembre, la Fuerza Aérea Finlandesa tiene 36 DXXI en servicio (LENTOLAIVUE -Llv- 24 y 26). El resto de la fuerza está compuesta por 10 obsoletos Bristol Bulldog IVa (Llv 26), destinados a defensa de puertos y ciudades en la retaguardia.

Según Osprey -que decir...- "la URSS alinea 3253 aviones desde el Océano Artico al Gofo de Finlandia", que volarán una media de 1000 misiones al día.

Las tácticas de caza

A pesar de su escasos medios, los pilotos de caza fineses estaban altamente entrenados gracias a Richard Lorentz, que, tan tempranamente como 1934, había descubierto que la pareja de vuelo era mucho más eficaz que la formación triangular de jefe con dos puntas, idea que se confirmó tras un tour de tres meses por Alemania.

Al comienzo de la guerra, por cierto, se ordena que no se entablen combates con otros cazas, por la inferioridad del DXXI frente al I-15bis, I-16 e I-153.

El estallido de la guerra.

El 30 de noviembre fue un día lluvioso, así que no hubieron combates. Al día siguiente la URSS envió una formación de 250 aviones para bombardear Helsinki y otros objetivos. Pese a su inferioridad numérica, los pilotos finlandeses atacaron.

El primer enfrentamiento tuvo lugar entre dos Bulldogs y 6 I-16bis del 75 IAP. Separados, uno de los Bulldogs logró dañar a un caza soviético antes de ser derribado. Herido, el piloto del Bulldog, Ututtu, se apuntaba así la primera victoria de la guerra. La Llv 24 hizo 59 salidas con sus DXXI ese día, derribando 11 bombarderos SB enemigos (24 y 41 SBAP).

El mal tiempo impediría las operaciones aéreas hasta el 19 de diciembre. La Llv 24 hizo 58 salidas sobre el itsmo de Karelia y participó en 22 combates con el enemigo, derribando 7 SB y 5 DB-3. Cuatro días más tarde seis SB fueron derribados sobre el itsmo de Karelia, junto con dos I-16bis. Hasta el momento, a costa de un caza derribado y otro dañado, la Llv 24 sumaba 54 victorias.

En la mañana del 6 de enero de 1940, 17 bombarderos DB-3M de la 6DBAP despegan desde Estonia para bombardear Kuopio, en el este de Finlandia. Los 9 primeros atacan su objetivo según lo previsto, pero los restantes se desvían de su ruta y cruzar el golfo de Finlandia cerca de Utti, donde tiene su base el 4/Llv24, que tenía un avión, el del teniente Sovelius, en el aire. Sovelius ataca y derriba a un bombardero, pero el resto de la formación prosigue su camino y lanzan sus bombas, pero sin gran efecto. En su camino de regreso son atacados por el teniente Sarvanto, que, en cuatro minutos, daña a 6 bombarderos que se estrellan entre Utti y Tavastila.

El 17 de enero 10 DXXI atacan a una formación de 25 SB del 54 SBAP que regresaban de un ataque via el itsmo de Karelia. Veinticinco minutos después, nueve bombarderos habían sido derribados y muchos más dañados. Otros dos bombarderos SB serían derribados por dos pilotos fineses dos días después, tras lo cual los soviéticos interrumpen sus ataques sobre el sureste de Finlandia por casi dos semanas

Por su parte, Suecia, que teme lo que le puede pasar si Finlandia cae, envía una fuerza voluntaria que mezcla tropas de tierra y aviación, que es destinada a Laponia, la parte más desprotegida de Finlandia. Allí se instala la Flygfottilj 19, dotada de doce cazas Gladiator y 4 Harts. El 12 de enero vuelan su primera misión, perdiendo dos cazas Harts que chocan en el regreso y otro que es derribado. El teniente Jacobi, con el Gladiator "F" derriba un I-15bis. La F19 vuela 600 misiones, y derriba sólo 8 aviones, pero auyenta a los bombarderos rusos.

Pilotos de Pruebas en Guerra.

La Fábrica Estatal de Aviones Finesa se hallaba en Tampere, en el sur de Finlandia, donde también tenía su base la unidad de pruebas de la Fuerza Aérea finesa, la Koelentue. Los pilotos de esta unidad comenzaron a volar los aviones nuevos o reparados que salían de esta fábrica, que se convierte en objetivo primario de la aviación rusa.

El primer derribo lo logra el líder de la unidad, el capitán Ehrnrooth, el 13 de enero de 1940, con el Fiat G-50 SA-1, al derribar un SB cerca de Tampere, al que suma, dos días después, otro más.

Llega la Ayuda Extranjera

Además de los Fokker, se encargan 25 Fiat G-50 para la LLv 26, que se compran el 23 de octubre de 1939 en Italia. Para asegurar su rapida entrega, se enviaban por tren a Alemania y de ahí por barco en Suecia, donde se montaban y llevaban por aire a Finlandia. Dos aviones llegan así en diciembre de 1939, y 6 habían llegado a Stettin cuando Alemania los envía de vuelta a Suiza. Enviados por mar, no llegan hasta el 15 de febrero de 1940.

Gran Bretaña dona 30 Gladiators, el primero de los cuales llega el 18 de enero, y el resto un mes después. Inicialmente los usa la Llv 26, que los transfiere en marzo a las Llv 12 y 14.

A principios de 1940 Francia dona 50 MS 406, llegan los primeros, via Suecia, el 4 de febrero. A fines de mes ya hay 30 en servicio. Asimismo, se prueba la compra en EEUU de 40 Brewster modelo 239. En marzo de 1939 llegan 6 a Suecia, una semana antes del fin del conflicto. Se asignan al Llv 22.

También tarde llegaron 12 Hurricane Mk I ex-RAF, y Francia dona 80 cazas ligeros CR.714, de los que sólo llegan 6, los cuales, por su escasa resistencia, no vuelan practicamente nunca.

A partir del 1 de febrero los soviéticos cambian sus tácticas. Lanzan una gran ofensiva en el itsmo de Karelia y sus bombarderos dejan de ser usados en ataques estratégicos para dar apoyo tático, mientras grandes masas de cazas patrullan el frente y penetran en territorio finlandés.

En este periodo el número de cazas disponibles aumenta de 45 a 67, con los Gladiators usados para enfrentarse a los cazas y los DXXI a los bombarderos, tarea que se complica con la introducción soviética de escolta para los bombarderos.

Tras dos semanas de prueba, el Llv 26 consigue su primera victoria con los Gladiators, el 2 de febrero de 1940, cuando el teniente Berg se enfrenta a 6 I-153 derriba uno, más los dos cazas derribados por el sargento Tuominen, conseguidos al atacar una formación de 2 SB y 6 I-153 sobre el golfo de Finlandia.

Once días más tarde, mientras 6 Gladiators se enfrentan con los I-153 al norte del Ladoga, 9 SB del 39 SBAP llegan en medio de la lucha, justo cuando el WO (aspirante a oficial) Lautamiki y su ala, el sargento Tuominen, se suman al combate. Con los cazas soviéticos ocupados luchando contra el grueso de los cazas fineses, Lautamiki se lanza con su comapñero contra los bombarderos, derribando cinco en rápida sucesión. Tuominen, que logra tres victorias y media, se convierte en el primer as de los Gladiators. Otros dos bombarderos fueron derribados por sus compañeros de escuadrón.

Los combates sobre el istmo de Karelia son encarnizados, con numerosas bajas por ambos bandos. Se aprende que el Gladiator tiene problemas para enfrentarse con los I-153 e I-16, por lo que se acelera la entrada en servicio de los cazas Fiat G.50, que se cobran su primera victoria el 26 de febrero, cuando el teniente Puhaka derriba un I-16 y su ala, el teniente Linnamaa, un DB-3.

Los fineses sufren graves bajas el 29, cuando los cazas soviéticos atacan las bases de las LLv 24 y 26, perdiendose 6 Gladiator y 1 DXXI, derribando sólo un I-16, más otro que se estrella.

Con la retirada de Karelia y el establecimiento de las cabezas de puente rusas al otro lado del golfo de Finlandia, toda la fuerza aérea finesa es lanzada al combate, atacando las columnas que avanzan e inmovilizandolas con ataques de precisión quirurgica.

Finalmente, cuando termina la guerra de invierno, el 8 de marzo, los cazas fineses han volado 3486 salidas y derribado 170 aviones enemigos, a cambio de 23 cazas perdidos. La fuerza aérea finesa hizo en total 5693 misiones, reclamando 203 derribos por 53 perdidas propias. La Artillería Antiaérea reclama 314 aviones rusos.

El máximo as finés fue Jorma Sarvanto con 13 derribos


El Fokker D XXI fue el caza más numeroso al principio del conflicto.

Pais de origen: Holanda

Tipo: Caza monoplaza

Dimensiones:
Envergadura: 11.00 m; longitud 8.20 m; altura 2.95 m; area alar 16.20 m2.

Motores:
(Holandes) un 830 hp (619 kW) Bristol Mercury VIII radial con una helice Ratier
(Danes)Un motor Mercury VIS con 645 hp (481 kW) y helice Ratier.
(Finlandes) un Pratt & Whitney R-1535-SB4-G o C Twin Wasp Junior 14-cylinder de dos columnas radial con 825 hp (615 kW) con una helice Hamilton Standard.

Performance:
(Mercury VIII) Maxima velocidad: 286 mph (480 km/h) a 14,500 ft (4420 m)
(P&W R-1535) Maxima velocidad 272 mph (439 km/h)

Techo de servicio:
(Mercury) 36,090 ft (11000 m)
(P&W R-1535) 32,000 ft (9750 m).

Alcance:
(Mercury) 950 km; (P&W R-1535) 900 km.

Peso:
(Mercury) Vacio 1422 kg con un peso maximo de despegue de: 2050 kg
(P&W R-1535) Vacio 1534 kg con un oeso maximo de despegue de 2186 kg.

Armamento:
(Holandes) Cuatro ametralladoras de 7.9 mm (0.312 in) FN-Browning M.36, dos en el fuselaje y dos en las alas
(Danes) Dos ametralladoras Madsen de 7.9 mm (0.312 in) en las alas y dos cañones Madsen de 20 mm en gondolas bajo las alas.
(Finlandes) Cuatro ametralldoras de 7.7 mm (0.303 in) Vickers en las alas.


http://www.acesofww2.com/finland/Finland.htm
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Notapor syncho » 15 Oct 2007, 18:46

ASES ALIADOS WWII

Sacados de los foros del Gran Capitán:

http://www.elgrancapitan.org/foro/-span-class-topictitle-a-href-viewtopicphpt1517-class-topictitle-ases-segunda-guerra-mundial-aliados-vt1517.html

Ases Britanicos:
Johnny"James Edgar Johnson 38
"Paddy" * Brendan Eugene Finucane (Irish) 32 (KIA 15jul42)
"Cherry" William Vale 31
"Bob" Robert Roland Stanford Tuck 30 (POW 28jan42, esc.1feb45)
"Bob" John Randall Daniel Braham 29 (19 at night, POW 19jun44)
"Ginger" James Henry Lacey 28 (+4 prob & 9 dam)
Neville Frederick Duke 28
Frank Reginald Carey 28
"Sawn-Off" Eric Stanley Lock 26 - 25 (MIA 3aug41)
Billy Drake 25 - 23 (+15 OTG & 7 prob)

Ases Norteamericanos
Dick" Richard Ira Bong 40 (KIFA 6aug45, MoH)
"Tom" Thomas Buchanan McGuire Jr. 38 (KIA 7jan45, MoH)
"Dave" David S. McCampbell 34 (MoH)
"Pappy" Gregory Boyington 28 (MoH)
"Gabby" Francis Stanley Gabreski 28 (+6.5 Korea, POW 20jul44)
"Bob" Robert Samuel Johnson 28
"Mac" Charles Henry MacDonald 27
"Rasty" George Earl Preddy jr. 26.83 (KIA 25dec44)
"Joe" Joseph Jacob Foss 26 (MoH)
"Bob" Robert Murray Hanson 25 (KIA 3feb44)

Ases Sovieticos
Ivan Nikitovich Kozhedub 62
"Sasha" Alexandre Ivanovich Pokryshkin 59 - 53
Grigori Andreevich Rechkalov 58 - 56
Nikolai Dimitrievich Gulayev 57 - 56
Dimitriy Boisovich Glinka 56 - 50
Kirill Alexeevich Yevstigneyev 53 - 52
Nikolai Mikhailovich Skomorokov 52 - 46
Arsenii Vasilevich Vorozheykin 52 - 46
Vladimir Gregoriev Serov 50
Alexandre Fedorovich Klubov 50 - 31

Ases Franceses
Pierre Henri Closterman (RAF) 33 (Brazil)
Marcel Albert (VVS, AdLA) 23
Pierre Le Gloan 22-18 (KIFA 11sep43)
Jean E. Francois Demozay (RAF) 21-18
Edmond Marin la Meslee (FAFL,AdLA) 20-16 (KIA 4feb45)
Michel Dorance 17-14
Camille Plubeau (AdLA) 17-14
Roland de La Poype 17-7
Roger Sauvage 17-5
Louis Delfino 16-14

Ases Polacos:
"Gabby" Francis Stanley Gabreski (RAF, USAAF) 28
Stanislaw Skalski (PAF, RAF) 23 - 21
"Mike" Boleslaw Gladych (PAF, AdLA, RAF, USAAF) 26 - 14
Witold Urbanowicz (AVG, RAF, USAAF) 20
Eugeniusz Horbaczewski (RAF) 16.5 (+4 V-1s KIA 18aug44)
Jan Eugeniusz Zumbach (RAF) 12.5 (POW)
Marian Pisarek (PAF,RAF) 12.5-11 (KIA 29apr42)
Michal Maciejowski (RAF) 11.5-9.5 (POW 9sep43)
Antoni Glowacki (RAF) 11.33-8.33
Henryk Szczesny (PAF,RAF) 11.33-9.33 (POW 4apr43

Ases Griegos
Ioannis Agorastos (John) Plagis (RAF) 16 (+4prob & 7dam)
Spiros Nikolas (Steve) Pisanos (RAF, USAAF) 10 (71sq & 4th FG)
"Vass" Vassilios (Michael) Vassiliades (RAF) 10 (KIA 25mar45)
Andreas Antoniou (GAF) 5.5

Ases Canadienses
"Screwball" "Buzz" George Frederick Beurling (both) 32
"Woody" Vernon Crompton Woodward (both) 21
Henry Wallace McLeod (RCAF)21-19 (KIA 27sep44) * *
"Hilly" Mark Henry Brown 18.5 -7.5 (+5.5 prob & 3 dam) (KIA 12nov41)
"Willie" William Lidstone McKnight (RAF) 16.5 (+1 dam, KIA 12jan41) *
"Bill" William Thomas Klersy (RCAF) 16.5-14.5 (KIFA 22may?45)
"Buck"Robert Wendell McNair 16 (+2 prob & 13 dam)
"John"Edward Francis John Charles 15.5 (UK born, D 5nov1986)
"Don" Donald Currie Laubman (RCAF) 15 (+3 dam, POW 14apr45) *

Australia
"Killer" Clive Robertson Caldwell 28.5
Adrian Philip Goldsmith 18 - 16
"Les" Leslie Redford Clisby (RAF) 16.5 - 10 (KIA 15may40)
"Ape" Richard Nigel Cullen (RAF)16 (KIA 4mar41)
John Lloyd Waddy (RAF, SAAF) 15.5
"Bluey" Keith William Truscott (RAAF)15 (KIFA 28mar43)
"Pat" Patterson Clarence Hughes (RAF) 15 (KIA 7sep40)
Mervin C. Shipard (RAF) 14 -13
Charles Curnow Scherf (RCAF) 13.5
Frederick Anthony Owen Gaze (RAF) 12.5
Peter St.George Bruce Turnbull (RAAF) 12 (KIA 27aug42)

Nueva Zelanda
Colin Falkland Gray (RAF) 27
"Al" Alan Christopher Deere (RAF) 21
Evan Dall Mackie 21
Raymond Brown Hesselyn (RNZAF) 21
"Bill" William Vernon Crawford-Compton 21
Brian John George Carbury (RAF) 15.5
"Johnny" John Milne Checketts 14.5
"Cobber" Edgar James Kain (RAF) 14
Gray Stenborg 14 (KIA 24sep43)
John Donald Rae 13 (POW 22aug43)
Ases Britanicos:
Johnny"James Edgar Johnson 38
"Paddy" * Brendan Eugene Finucane (Irish) 32 (KIA 15jul42)
"Cherry" William Vale 31
"Bob" Robert Roland Stanford Tuck 30 (POW 28jan42, esc.1feb45)
"Bob" John Randall Daniel Braham 29 (19 at night, POW 19jun44)
"Ginger" James Henry Lacey 28 (+4 prob & 9 dam)
Neville Frederick Duke 28
Frank Reginald Carey 28
"Sawn-Off" Eric Stanley Lock 26 - 25 (MIA 3aug41)
Billy Drake 25 - 23 (+15 OTG & 7 prob)

Ases Norteamericanos
Dick" Richard Ira Bong 40 (KIFA 6aug45, MoH)
"Tom" Thomas Buchanan McGuire Jr. 38 (KIA 7jan45, MoH)
"Dave" David S. McCampbell 34 (MoH)
"Pappy" Gregory Boyington 28 (MoH)
"Gabby" Francis Stanley Gabreski 28 (+6.5 Korea, POW 20jul44)
"Bob" Robert Samuel Johnson 28
"Mac" Charles Henry MacDonald 27
"Rasty" George Earl Preddy jr. 26.83 (KIA 25dec44)
"Joe" Joseph Jacob Foss 26 (MoH)
"Bob" Robert Murray Hanson 25 (KIA 3feb44)

Ases Sovieticos
Ivan Nikitovich Kozhedub 62
"Sasha" Alexandre Ivanovich Pokryshkin 59 - 53
Grigori Andreevich Rechkalov 58 - 56
Nikolai Dimitrievich Gulayev 57 - 56
Dimitriy Boisovich Glinka 56 - 50
Kirill Alexeevich Yevstigneyev 53 - 52
Nikolai Mikhailovich Skomorokov 52 - 46
Arsenii Vasilevich Vorozheykin 52 - 46
Vladimir Gregoriev Serov 50
Alexandre Fedorovich Klubov 50 - 31

Ases Franceses
Pierre Henri Closterman (RAF) 33 (Brazil)
Marcel Albert (VVS, AdLA) 23
Pierre Le Gloan 22-18 (KIFA 11sep43)
Jean E. Francois Demozay (RAF) 21-18
Edmond Marin la Meslee (FAFL,AdLA) 20-16 (KIA 4feb45)
Michel Dorance 17-14
Camille Plubeau (AdLA) 17-14
Roland de La Poype 17-7
Roger Sauvage 17-5
Louis Delfino 16-14

Ases Polacos:
"Gabby" Francis Stanley Gabreski (RAF, USAAF) 28
Stanislaw Skalski (PAF, RAF) 23 - 21
"Mike" Boleslaw Gladych (PAF, AdLA, RAF, USAAF) 26 - 14
Witold Urbanowicz (AVG, RAF, USAAF) 20
Eugeniusz Horbaczewski (RAF) 16.5 (+4 V-1s KIA 18aug44)
Jan Eugeniusz Zumbach (RAF) 12.5 (POW)
Marian Pisarek (PAF,RAF) 12.5-11 (KIA 29apr42)
Michal Maciejowski (RAF) 11.5-9.5 (POW 9sep43)
Antoni Glowacki (RAF) 11.33-8.33
Henryk Szczesny (PAF,RAF) 11.33-9.33 (POW 4apr43

Ases Griegos
Ioannis Agorastos (John) Plagis (RAF) 16 (+4prob & 7dam)
Spiros Nikolas (Steve) Pisanos (RAF, USAAF) 10 (71sq & 4th FG)
"Vass" Vassilios (Michael) Vassiliades (RAF) 10 (KIA 25mar45)
Andreas Antoniou (GAF) 5.5

Ases Canadienses
"Screwball" "Buzz" George Frederick Beurling (both) 32
"Woody" Vernon Crompton Woodward (both) 21
Henry Wallace McLeod (RCAF)21-19 (KIA 27sep44) * *
"Hilly" Mark Henry Brown 18.5 -7.5 (+5.5 prob & 3 dam) (KIA 12nov41)
"Willie" William Lidstone McKnight (RAF) 16.5 (+1 dam, KIA 12jan41) *
"Bill" William Thomas Klersy (RCAF) 16.5-14.5 (KIFA 22may?45)
"Buck"Robert Wendell McNair 16 (+2 prob & 13 dam)
"John"Edward Francis John Charles 15.5 (UK born, D 5nov1986)
"Don" Donald Currie Laubman (RCAF) 15 (+3 dam, POW 14apr45) *

Australia
"Killer" Clive Robertson Caldwell 28.5
Adrian Philip Goldsmith 18 - 16
"Les" Leslie Redford Clisby (RAF) 16.5 - 10 (KIA 15may40)
"Ape" Richard Nigel Cullen (RAF)16 (KIA 4mar41)
John Lloyd Waddy (RAF, SAAF) 15.5
"Bluey" Keith William Truscott (RAAF)15 (KIFA 28mar43)
"Pat" Patterson Clarence Hughes (RAF) 15 (KIA 7sep40)
Mervin C. Shipard (RAF) 14 -13
Charles Curnow Scherf (RCAF) 13.5
Frederick Anthony Owen Gaze (RAF) 12.5
Peter St.George Bruce Turnbull (RAAF) 12 (KIA 27aug42)

Nueva Zelanda
Colin Falkland Gray (RAF) 27
"Al" Alan Christopher Deere (RAF) 21
Evan Dall Mackie 21
Raymond Brown Hesselyn (RNZAF) 21
"Bill" William Vernon Crawford-Compton 21
Brian John George Carbury (RAF) 15.5
"Johnny" John Milne Checketts 14.5
"Cobber" Edgar James Kain (RAF) 14
Gray Stenborg 14 (KIA 24sep43)
John Donald Rae 13 (POW 22aug43)
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Notapor syncho » 15 Oct 2007, 18:53

A ver si consigo estos libros en pdf:



Alguien ha leído alguno?
Última edición por syncho el 16 Oct 2007, 02:21, editado 1 vez en total
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Notapor syncho » 15 Oct 2007, 19:09

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Notapor syncho » 15 Oct 2007, 19:17

Imagen

8 reglas famosas de Oswald Boelcke:

Oswald Boelcke (19 de mayo de 1891 – 28 de octubre de 1916) fue un piloto alemán durante la Primera Guerra Mundial y uno de los más influyentes líderes y estrategas de los primeros años del combate aéreo. Se le considera el padre de la fuerza aérea alemana. Fue el primero en formalizar las reglas del combate aéreo, que fueron recogidas en Dicta Boelcke. El gran as alemán, Manfred von Richthofen fue enseñado por
Boelcke y contuinuó idolatrando a su mentor mucho después de haberle superado en victorias:

“Después de todo sólo soy un piloto de combate pero Boeckle fue un héroe” (Manfred Von Richthofen, 1917)

Boelcke nació en Giebichenstein, hijo de un profesor de escuela que había vuelto hacía poco de Argentina. Su apellido se escribía originalmente Bölcke. Sin embargo, Oswald, junto con su hermano mayor Wilhem, quitaron el umlaut y adoptaron el deletreo latino en lugar del alemán. La pronunciación es la misma.

Después de dejar la escuela se alistó en el Telegraphen-Bataillon Nr. 3 en Koblenz como Fahnenjunker (oficial cadete). A mediados de 1914 fue transferido al Fliegertruppe. Su entrenamiento duró desde mayo hasta agosto de ese año en el Halberstädter Fliegerschule y posteriormente fue transferido de manera inmediata al servicio activo.

Boelcke fue inicialmente asignado al Fliegerabteilung 13, luego transferido al Fliegerabteilung 62 en abril de 1915, con base en Douai. El observador en el equipo de Boelcke derribó el primer avión el 4 de julio de 1915. Aquel mismo mes, Boelcke y Max Immelmann se convirtieron en los primeros pilotos de combate alemán, al proporcionarles los dos primeros Fokker E.I, equipados con ametralladoras frontales de fuego sincronizado. Boelcke ganó su primer combate aéreo el 19 de agosto de 1915, derribando cuatro aviones enemigos más antes de que terminase el año y otros cuatro más en enero de 1916. Ese mismo mes, junto con Immelmann, fue el primer piloto alemán que recibió la medalla Pour le Mérite. Después de que Immelmann fuese muerto en combate en junio de 1916, Boelcke se convirtió en el mejor as de aviación alemán. En marzo de 1916 fue hecho líder del recientemente formado Fliegerabteilung Sivery, que dirigió sobre Verdun.

La fuerza aérea alemana, la Luftstreitkräfte, fue reorganizada a mediados de 1916 y Boelcke fue elegido como comandante del Jagdstaffel Nr 2, comúnmente llamado Jasta 2, en septiembre. Entre sus primeros elegidos se encontraban Manfred Von Richthofen, Erwin Böhme,Hans Reimann y Werner Voss. Inicialmente sobre el nuevo biplano Albatros D.II sobre Somme, Boelcke derribó once aviones del Royal Flying Corps en su primer mes con el Jasta 2. Su escuadrilla, siempre volaba en una formaciones muy disciplinadas y tácticas.

Boelcke murió cuando su Albatros D.II chocó con el de Böhme durante un dog fight con D.H. 2s del Escuadro nº 24 de la RFC. Boelcke tiene cuarenta victorias en su haber. Böhme sobrevivió al impacto, pero el horror de lo sucedido casi le empujó al suicidio.

En la moderna Luftwaffe, el Jagdbombergeschwader 31 lleva el nombre de Boelcke.


Imagen

http://www.acepilots.com/wwi/ger_boelcke.html




1. Siempre intente asegurarse una posición ventajosa antes de atacar. Suba antes y durante el acercamiento para sorprender al enemigo por encima, y pique rápidamente sobre su cola cuando el momento para atacar este a mano.
2. intente ponerse entre el sol y el enemigo. Esto pone la luz intensa del sol en los ojos del enemigo, haciéndole muy difícil detectarlo y ala vez hacerle imposible dispararle con exactitud.
3. No dispare las ametralladoras hasta que el enemigo este dentro de su campo de tiro y hasta que usted lo tenga en ángulo recto dentro de su campo de vision.
4. Ataque cuando el enemigo menos lo espere o cuando él este preocupado con otros deberes como observación, fotografía o bombardeo.
5. Nunca intente huir de un caza enemigo. Si usted es sorprendido por un ataque en su cola, vuelvase y enfrente al enemigo.
6. Mantenga un ojo en el enemigo y no le permite engañarlo con trucos. Si su antagonista parece dañado, sígalo abajo hasta que él choque para cerciorarse que efectivamente él no está fingiendo.
7. Los actos tontos de valentía sólo traen muerte. El Jasta debe luchar como una unidad de trabajo en equipo entre todos los pilotos. Las ordenes de los líderes debe obedecerse.
8. Cuando entre a las lineas enemigas nunca olvide donde se encuentra sus propias lineas.
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syncho
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Notapor syncho » 15 Oct 2007, 19:37

Ah, se me olvidaba, y encima es de los hechos má importantes de la WWI:

El mecanismo para evitar que las ametralladores dieran a las helices de los aviones:


Imagen

Anton Herman Gerard 'Anthony' Fokker (6 de abril de 1890 - 23 de diciembre de 1939), nacido en Kediri en la isla de Java , ahora Indonesia). Fallecido en la ciudad de Nueva York, Estados Unidos. Fue un famoso constructor de aviones holandés.

Empezó a volar en 1911 y construyó su primer avión a los 20 años en Alemania (El Spin (Araña)).

Ganó reconocimiento durante la Gran Guerra por construir aviones para Alemania. Entre sus ideas más reseñables, estuvo la de inventar un dispositivo que sincronizase las ametralladoras con la hélice, de modo que pudiesen disparar a través de ésta sin dañarla. Sus mejores creaciones fueron el monoplano Fokker E III, el triplano Fokker Dr I, y el que es considerado el mejor caza del conflicto, el Fokker D.VII.

Tras la guerra y debido al Tratado de Versalles, los alemanes no podían construir aviones e incluso motores para éstos en Alemania. Entonces se trasladó a los Países Bajos y fundó su primera compañía para la construcción de aviones en 1919. Se ocupó tanto del diseño de aviones civiles como militares.

En 1922 se trasladó a los Estados Unidos, presidiendo la Atlantic Aircraft Corporation hasta 1930.


Logró construir un mecanismo que sincronizaba el giro de la hélice con los disparos de la ametralladora, con lo que ya no hacía falta recurrir a pesadas placas de refuerzo, simplemente el arma disparaba por los espacios entre las palas y dejaba de funcionar en cuanto una pala se ponía delante del cañón, cosa de fracciones de segundo

Más información en wikipedia:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthony_Fokker

Fokker DR 1
http://www.europa1939.com/aviones/cazas/dr1.html
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Notapor Kidd » 15 Oct 2007, 19:44

El problema del sistema de Fokker de sincronizacion es que al ser mecanico con el alto grado de limpieza que habia en aquel entonces cascaba cada dos por tres (y casi siempre en vuelo, para no contradecir a Murphy)
Los britanicos hicieron uno que montaron en sus Camel que al ser hidraulico y casi blindado tenia una tasa de fallo menor que el Fokker

En la segunda ya solo el Eje montaba en sus aviones las ametralladaoras en el morro, los aliados ya montaban todo el armamento en las alas y dejaban el morro solo para los motores
Última edición por Kidd el 15 Oct 2007, 19:50, editado 1 vez en total
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